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1. Introduction
Analysts and policy-makers increasingly notice a changing nature of innovation. More and
more, innovation is perceived as a systemic, horizontal phenomenon caused by, and influ-
encing, a broad spectrum of factors, while the related political institutions are quite narrow
and vertical in their thematic focus, working in a departmentalised and fragmented manner.
These discrepancies, nevertheless, are becoming one of the most dangerous bottlenecks of
future innovation systems.
Against this background, the Six Countries Programme held a workshop on “New Govern-
ance for Innovation? The Need for Horizontal Policy Coordination”. The workshop was
organised by the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research together with
the Department of Innovation Studies of the Copernicus Institute for Sustainable Devel-
opment and Innovation at the University of Utrecht and was held in Karlsruhe on Novem-
ber 14 and 15, 2003. The organisers gratefully acknowledge a support grant by the German
Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF, PLI2031).
More than 50 international participants exchanged their thoughts on the issue and traced
the preconditions, models and cases of new modes of governance for innovation. The
workshop format facilitated brainstorming and a free, open-minded discussion among
creative analysts and policy-makers, touching upon typical policy deadlocks and exploring
new ways of policy co-ordination.
After a short welcoming address by Engelbert Beyer of the German Federal Ministry for
Education and Research, two key note presentations explored the political and the concep-
tual need for systemic policy approaches. In order to learn about and discuss concrete
challenges and practices, two thematic cases were dealt with in depth: (1) innovation in the
area of health/food; (2) innovation in the area of transportation and sustainability. The
presentations both sketched the problem dimensions of horizontal policy co-ordination and
introduced promising cases. Thereby, particular attention was paid to the relationships
between various ministries or other public authorities involved, as well as advisory bodies,
parliaments, research institutions, non-governmental stakeholder organisations, and of
course industry. A round-table of policy-makers from heterogeneous fields debated what
'horizontal co-ordination' would mean in real life policymaking circumstances. On the ba-
sis of this debate, the "Karlsruhe-Utrecht Principles for Horizontal Innovation Policy-
making", which were drafted by the organisers before the workshop, were discussed, and
comments by the participants were gathered and fed into the final version of the principles.
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it restates the thematic context of the work-
shop by summarising the major challenges for innovation policy-making in face of the
given institutional settings and new as well as traditional characteristics of the innovation4
process. Second, it summarises the presentations, discussions and major results of the
workshop.1 Finally, it states the final version of the Karlsruhe-Utrecht principles .
2. The Context:
Challenges for Horizontal Innovation Policymaking
Catchwords emphasising the emergence of a new mode of transdisciplinary and multi-site
knowledge production (Gibbons et al. 1994), or the advent of "post-academic science"
(Ziman 2001), or of "post-modern science" driven by heterogeneity (Rip 2002) may not
distract our attention from the fact that most of today's public "bread-and-butter" research
and innovation policies still are conceptualised and run in quite a traditional departmental-
ised manner. How can potential innovation – i.e. creative destruction – enter the power
games of institutionalised policy arenas and traditional markets? Quite often, potentially
path-breaking socio-technical ideas (findings, "solutions") emerge in environments rather
different from those of their final application and diffusion (think e.g. of the "European
paradox": excellent science but low innovation rates ...). The departmentalisation and
fragmentation of innovation-related policy arenas is twofold:
(1)  The "research system" of academic science, research, and industrial technology de-
velopment – modern birthplaces of findings and ideas relevant to innovation – is
constructed through quite a specific set of departmentalised institutions like univer-
sities, non-university institutes and private laboratories, each with different interests,
value-orientations and incentives. Over years related actor groups have established a
specific, rather closed policy arena and learned to arrange their co-operation and
competition games vis-à-vis public policies. Fragmentation within the research sys-
tem reinforces (and is reinforced by) fragmentation of its relations to public policy.
(2)  The worlds of potential innovation users – i.e. related markets, industries,
stakeholders, politics – are constructed along historical trajectories of ideologies, in-
terest coalitions, institutions, nested around established problem perceptions. Related
public policies are pursued in many different thematic policy arenas which have
evolved apart from the innovation policy arena.
Thus, new combinations of knowledge, demand and public interventions are hampered yet:
public policymaking capitalising effectively on the innovation potential of "mode 2 knowl-
edge production" and of "post-modern heterogeneity-based science" would have to bridge
the diverging perspectives (interests) of societal subsystems and related policy arenas. A
horizontally and systemically co-ordinated innovation policy conceptualised as bridging
(or systemic) policy requires a new governance for innovation. This policy concept would
                                                
1  We stress that these summaries are based on our perceptions of the presentations, i.e. citations referring to
the authors shall not be based on this report.5
have to be guided by an "innovation system" approach: "A system of innovation is that set
of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contributes to the development and
diffusion of new technologies and which provides the framework within which govern-
ments form and implement policies to influence the innovation process. As such it is a
system of interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer the knowledge, skills and
artefacts which define new technologies" (Metcalfe 1995).
Presently the governance of politico-administrative systems in general and innovation
policy in particular in most OECD countries is characterised by (see also Smits/Kuhlmann
2002)
•  a high degree of departmentalisation, sectoralisation of the political administration, and
low inter-departmental exchange and co-operation
•  heterogeneous, un-linked arenas: often corporatist negotiation deadlocks
•  failing attempts at restructuring responsibilities in government because of institutional
inertia
•  dominance of "linear model" of innovation in policy approaches (and of related econo-
mists as consultants)
•  "innovation policy" run in a very specific, narrow field focusing on introduction of new
technologies in SMEs, IPR or VC issues etc.
•  emerging multi-level governance in the context of the European integration makes the
launching of "bridging/systemic" policy approaches even more difficult.
Jacobsson and Johnson (2000), in an analysis of the innovation systems approach in energy
systems, identified typical weaknesses of under-co-ordinated innovation policymaking:
there is poorly articulated demand; local search processes which miss opportunities else-
where; too weak networks (hindering knowledge transfer); too strong networks (causing
‘lock-in’, dominance of incumbent actors); legislation in favour of incumbent technolo-
gies; flaws in the capital market; lack of highly organised actors, meeting places and prime
movers.
Based on their analysis they propose new – innovation-focused and co-ordinating – roles
for government: supporting different designs, safeguarding variety, addressing a large port-
folio of technologies and innovations; strengthening linkages, management of interfaces,
reinforcing of user-producer relations, building new networks (Neue Kombinationen) and
deconstructing old ones (creative destruction); stimulating learning processes; raising
awareness, stimulating articulation of demand; monitoring the struggle between proponents
of new technologies and incumbents of the old ones; stimulating prime movers; taking care
of (very) long time horizon related to institutional change.
Thus in the future new modes of governance (and relatedly: government) would require a
broader understanding of policies for innovation:6
•  organisation and content of governance would have to take into account the systemic
nature of innovation, including the notion of complex, non-linear interaction (e.g. fos-
tering university – industry co-operation rather than transfer units, stimulating multi-
disciplinary research, fostering the debate on implications of mode 2 for universities and
other institutions in the innovation system, more in particular with regard to missions,
culture, reward structures, relations between institutions, quality control, ...)
•  government and administration would have to deal more proactively with the challenge
of moderating cross-sectoral linkages and supporting the (re-) structuring of cross-
sectoral networks (e.g. horizontal taskforces, sectoral councils, UK-Foresight like ac-
tivities, ...)
•  this would include consequent attempts to re-organise administrations in a way that en-
ables flexible horizontal co-ordination and exchange among formally divided entities
(task-oriented mobility of staff, training of staff, changes in reward systems that stimu-
late horizontal initiatives, ...)
•  a holistic notion of innovation policy, keeping in mind and taking advantage of the in-
ter-dependence of single specific policy measures as well as the inter-relation of differ-
ent policy areas (fostering cluster approaches, infrastructures facilitating the identifica-
tion of and access to strategic intelligence, co-ordinating bodies with a real mandate, a
parliamentary committee on innovation, …)
•  more elaborated forms of institutionalised co-ordination between the European level on
the one hand and the national and regional level on the other (e.g. initiating a political
debate on the ‘division of labour’ between the various administrative levels resulting in
clear decisions and strategies, furthering the development of networks of excellence, ...).
3. New Governance for Innovation: conceptual
considerations from a political science perspective
In the first key note presentation of the conference, Dietmar Braun, University of
Lausanne, discussed the need for a "New Governance for Innovation". The main argument
of his both analytical and normative contribution was that the institutional structures and
policy approaches have not yet adjusted to the radically changing conditions for innovation
policy. For his analysis Braun combined three major concepts: (1) interactive instead of
linear models in the innovation process, (2) mode 2 of the production of knowledge and (3)
the systems of innovation approach. The consequences of these concepts for innovation
policymaking are straightforward: “knowledge” must be put in the centre when thinking
about the production and innovation process, therefore, collaboration between basic re-
search and the technological trajectory are crucial. Furthermore, innovation is a result of
systemic and interactive rather than linear processes, which means that the institutional
setting, that emerged under the condition of mode 1 knowledge production, is put under
severe pressure to adjust both the institutions themselves and the design of policy. For
Braun, the two major problem categories of the current institutional design for innovation7
policymaking are (a) the lack of horizontal, inter-systemic cooperation and coordination
and (b) the institutional fragmentation.
In order to overcome the lack of horizontal coordination, Braun demanded a new policy
design which defines the role of the state as a moderator and enabler within a network-,
interaction- and process-oriented approach rather than a hierarchical interventionist ori-
ented towards "picking the winners". In his view, the process-orientation needs to be ac-
companied by a legal infrastructure favourable to innovation, such as appropriate IPR
structures and more flexible career structures of researchers enabling them to move be-
tween industry and academia. Furthermore, to support spontaneous horizontal coordination
by interaction and openness, Braun – with reference to Guston (2000) – called for special-
ised boundary organisations that span the friction between the science and the political
system.
Braun’s approach to overcome institutional fragmentation is based on building up new
institutional rationalities and cultures and of capacities to reflect on the systemic nature of
science and innovation. With reference to the Austrian Council for Research and Technol-
ogy Development, one key for Braun is the permanent integration of major stakeholders in
the policymaking process who have a say in the strategic design of policymaking. Thus,
different rationalities and interests are reconciled and fed into the policy process of all
ministries involved. Coordination of ministries would be achieved indirectly, but more
effectively than with inter-ministerial committees. In addition, funding agencies – with all
their embedded expertise and experience – need to be involved in the strategic thinking of
innovation policy, ideally enabling their cooperation, e.g. following the model of the UK
Council.2
Above all, however, a new governance for innovation is needed to enable and foster re-
flexivity throughout the system, understood as the “capacity to think in terms of the whole,
of problems and solutions and to anticipate the future. Thereby, the system and its actors
are empowered with the ability and potential to constantly adjust ongoing processes and to
question existing or emerging structures. Reflexive institutions can take very different
forms, such as systemic evaluations, structured national priority-setting, mediation systems
such as in the Netherlands or participatory approaches like the Science Council (Wissen-
schaftsrat) in Germany with its various working groups. Further possible models men-
tioned were the Austrian Council for Research and Technological Development or the re-
spective House of Lords structures. For Braun, the major prerequisite to structurally embed
horizontal coordination is to anchor such reflexive institutions and processes in scientific,
industrial and political (and one might add administrative) interests.
                                                
2  Examples given were the NWO (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, Nether-
lands Organisation for Scientific Research) and the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, German
Research Association) in Germany.8
In the discussion that followed Braun’s key note speech it was stressed that although for-
mal coordination was an important prerequisite, the merit of “enabling policies” through
informal means should not be forgotten. The representative of the German Federal Minis-
try (BMBF) mentioned the example of the take-off in the venture capital market in Ger-
many. Here, without formal coordination many different public and private actors worked
in the same direction in recognition of the opportunities opened up by the use of risk capi-
tal. It was agreed that both mechanisms are not alternative, but complementary.
While the concept of reflexive institutions was not controversial, the discussion of specific
examples showed that there are a couple of functional preconditions to be met, most im-
portantly: independence and not relying solely on one ministry and people should be se-
lected on the basis of expertise rather than seniority. One example that apparently managed
to work was the Finnish inter-ministerial committee, while the Austrian Council was de-
scribed by one of the analysts from this country as ineffective.
4. Innovation Policy in Selected Issue Areas
4.1 Health and Food
The convergence of Health and Food  leading to new food products that promise to provide
an additional health benefit ("functional food") to the consumer is an issue area that is es-
pecially suited to be discussed in the context of horizontal co-ordination for several rea-
sons. As the chair of the session, Thomas Reiss, ISI, pointed out, the area is populated by
very diverse actors and different agencies. The knowledge that is needed for health and
food stems at least from two scientific areas with their own institutional settings and ra-
tionals, i.e. medicine/ biology on the one hand and food research/engineering on the other
hand. Finally, although at the very end consumers have to be involved and convinced, the
area is highly regulated and it is not only the taste and norms of consumers that decide
about market success but public regulatory agencies. Besides, functional food is a rela-
tively new area and each innovation in this area must not only conform to regulation, but
establish itself against broad scepticism. Finally, both the end consumer’s attitudes and
regulatory institutions and rules differ considerably on the global market and even within
the EU. This not only results in very diverse conditions for the competition of companies
but also calls for complicated co-ordination on different policy levels, especially as most
companies in the area are international players.
The major framework conditions for the health and food sector is globalisation, and there-
fore the global meaning of national or regional regulation, the ageing of society and the
technological possibilities opened up by the information age and genomics.9
Hans Zevenbergen, R&D director Heart Health of Unilever, reported on efforts to intro-
duce novel food. His basic argument was that enormous obstruction (and even failure)
were due to fragmented political structures and a lack of political leadership and co-
ordination. According to Zevenbergen, the innovation process in the food and health sector
is extremely complex. The challenges it faces exceed those of most other sectors, as not
only economic success and social issues (impact on health system), but also ethical issues
need to be taken into consideration.
This latter aspect was highlighted in a brief introduction on a novel field of research at
Unilever. Before discussing two cases on innovation and – attempted – market introduc-
tion, Zevenbergen shortly described current developments in the food and health area that
are based on “nutrigenomics” which is already subject to intensive debate and will cer-
tainly pose a major challenge for the policy process in the years to come. Nutrigenomics
describes a science that enables customised products on the basis of individual genotyping.
Its breakthrough would mean a paradigm change in food development, as not only addi-
tional functions would be engineered into food, but these functions would be tailored for
each customer or for customer groups according to their genetic predispositions. Therefore,
on top of the regular challenges faced in the food and health sector, the ethical issue comes
into play, as the central question here is: how to organise genetic information as the basis
of food engineering, who owns the genetic information, and how can this ownership be
controlled effectively?
Zevenbergen discussed two cases. First, he reported on the attempt to introduce an im-
proved margarine in Europe. After years of elaborating on the necessary deep scientific
understanding, the product was ready for development, the proof of efficiency and effec-
tiveness was made, market implementation was prepared. Very early on in the whole proc-
ess, discussion with opinion leaders and consumers had started and worries had been taken
into consideration. However, the regulatory process in Europe proved very long – 2 years
as compared to 90 days in the USA – and in the course of this process obstacles came to
the fore that rendered the market introduction impossible. In Zevenbergen’s view, the pro-
cess itself was not transparent and predictable and he had found an open dialogue with
policy-makers very hard. The diversity of views on the issue across Europe exacerbated
consensus decision-making enormously. Moreover, the claim approval process in Europe
is still nationally organised which makes communication extremely complex and obstructs
clarity on criteria for scientific substantiation. Despite attempts to integrate various
stakeholders through a communication strategy, the overall process took 6 years, slowing
down the innovation and implementation process enormously and thus diminishing the
economic benefit of the innovation.
In his second case, Zevenbergen reported on a failed attempt to introduce genetically modi-
fied soja in Europe. He highlighted the role of public discourse in that sensitive area. As
conflicting messages on the safety and the benefit to end consumers were sent and the me-
dia picked up the issue, labelling it “Frankenstein Food”, it turned into a highly political
issue. The resistance that built up was finally insurmountable for the industry.10
Zevenbergen identified a set of lessons learned for the introduction of food. Given the ex-
treme complexity in the area, close coordination with regulatory agencies is crucial. As in
the case of nutrigenomics, public sentiment is much more sceptical towards modified food
in Europe than elsewhere, it is extremely important to send clear messages about the net
benefit for consumers and the ability to limit risks, and to integrate consumer groups very
early on in the discussion process. All stakeholders involved need to be very cautious very
early on as to what language to use and how the innovation is framed. Open and honest
communication must clarify the scientific backing of the innovation. Most importantly as
regards policy-makers, political authorities need to find a uniform position and even vision
and must declare their will, under which conditions they back an innovation. On that basis,
political leadership must be executed at all levels.
The discussion following Zevenbergen’s contribution tackled very different issues. Most
importantly, Zevenbergen was asked to explain the internal management of the complex
innovation process that apparently has several dimensions and therefore several sets of
rationales and norms. The key is a strategic and operative project management with a clear
goal communicated to everybody in the company and a clear mandate from the board
given to the operational level, the approach is leading through shared goals and visions.
In reaction to this, there was the view expressed from the audience that the major problem
in the area for the implementation of innovations was, first, the legal and regulatory mess
created in the multi-level and multi-departmental arena and, second, the lack of a clear
common vision which must take into account the different language frameworks of the
stakeholders involved. One might add that these two problems are inter-related, as the legal
mess and the multiplicity of regulatory agencies can be interpreted as a reaction to the sci-
entific and semantic complexity and the public uncertainty and fear, which in turn makes a
clear vision extremely hard to formulate.
The second contribution within the health and food case hooked up on this vision building
approach. Jens Katzek, Director of the German Association of Biotechnology Industries,
stressed the necessity to formulate clear-cut national policy strategies with clearly defined
responsibilities. As the major example Katzek refered to the Life Science Strategy for
Europe which is an integral part of the European strategy developed in the Barcelona
summit 2000 aiming at making Europe the number one knowledge-based economy in the
world by 2010. While according to Katzekthe biotechnology industry shares this vision,
the national implementation in Germany lacks the formulation of non-contradictory goals
and sends conflicting signals to industry. For Katzek, the first step towards this ambitious
European goal therefore was to formulate a coherent national strategy backed up by all
relevant policy institutions. This led him to his second point, i.e. the definition of distinct
administrative responsibilities in the context of research and innovation strategies. For ex-
ample, the goal formulated in the Barcelona summit is pursued through actions and plans
by federal ministries and coordinated by the head office of the chancellor, the result of
which is not easy for industry to discern .11
Katzek briefly mentioned four examples of the problems stemming from the lack of strat-
egy and clear-cut responsibilities. First, he stated that the campaign to push start-up com-
panies by the Federal Ministry for Economics (BMWi) was hampered by the tax systems
as it was hostile to the innovation process and advanced financing schemes. Second, the
allocation of public money for research in health-related aspects by the Federal Ministry
for Education and Research was not backed up sufficiently by activities of the Ministry of
Health to coordinate health insurance companies in order to make them buy products that
resulted from this publicly financed research. Another example cited was the policy of the
BMBF to finance a certain system for the safety assessment of plant biotechnology. In
Katzek's perception, this was hampered by the Federal Ministry for the Environment which
was not giving the necessary permits to the companies that developed the systems. Finally,
Katzek complained about a mismatch between the high level statements of the German
government labelling the biotech industry as a key industry for growth in the future and
some programme administrators who – in the view of Katzek – rather bluntly oppose the
development of a biotechnology industry in Germany.
The consequences for Katzek are obvious. Most importantly, he called for a re-design of
indirect measures such as the tax system and the patent protection regime, in order to set
incentives for industry that are in line with the innovation needs. Secondly, he asked for a
comprehensive monitoring of all activities in order to enable coherent approaches. Finally,
and in line with Zevenbergen, he asked for the definition of binding policy goals. Thus, his
major demand for policy-makers was that they should permanently check if their pro-
grammes and activity match the overall policy goals and if the measures themselves are
effective and efficient.
While the audience agreed with the main aspects of Katzek’s analysis, there was some
controversial discussion as to the role of clear visions and consensus. First of all, the view
was expressed that goal setting itself must be responsive to societal needs, as it was the art
of innovation policymaking to define goals that are operational for the administration and
at the same time reflect a broad societal consensus.
Furthermore, the question was raised if a formulation of one clear vision could be danger-
ous as it might block diversity and alternative roads to innovation. In this perspective, in-
ternal contradictions are natural and even functional, they are necessary in order to make
an effective “trial and error” approach possible.
National policy-makers confirmed these views, but differentiated even further. For them,
there are issue areas with intensive conflicts and those with a high level of consensus. Poli-
cymaking should start by defining the interests involved and should adjust consensus-
building and policy action accordingly. In their view, the prime task of policymaking,
therefore, was the definition of policy goals in the face of conflicting interests and views.
However, the policy-makers pointed to the problem of asymmetric cycles, as the relatively12
short-term legislative cycle in most issue areas was too short-term for the problems to be
tackled.
A representative of the European Commission took a somewhat opposing view. For him
coordination must function even in those areas where consensus cannot be reached, as in
many cases consensus is just not conceivable; however, policy still must deliver.
4.2 Transportation
The second case presented and discussed was transportation. As the chair Ruud Smits, Uni-
versity of Utrecht, pointed out, this issue area is again characterised by a multitude of ac-
tors responsible for and directly effected by policy action. The interests involved in trans-
port infrastructure projects are huge, and the conflicts over the modal mix and the check
for external effects are driven by diverse rationales, such as economic considerations call-
ing for efficient and fast mobility of persons and goods – not to mention the transportation
sector itself – on the one hand, and concerns  related to environmental and safety issues on
the other. Moreover, transportation is a classical area in which by nature both the European
level (trans-European networks, intermodality) and the local level, where the negative ef-
fects of national and European infrastructure projects are felt and opposed, play a crucial
role.
Against this background, all speakers presenting their transportation cases stressed not only
the current problem complex related to mobility and infrastructure, but also the growing
pressure on the European societies stemming from rising transportation and related exter-
nal effects. Innovation policymaking in this area therefore is challenged to meet the grow-
ing mobility needs by pushing developments of more effective and capable infrastructure
and transport means, and at the same time ensuring environmental and safety standards
(sustainability).
Claude van Rooten, Head of the Belgian Road Research Centre (BRRC) and President of
the Forum of European National Highway Research Laboratories (FEHRL) presented the
perspective of transportation researchers and engineers who are challenged to develop new
technologies to meet the conflicting interests just mentioned. The BRRC is a contract re-
search institute that is organised around its contract project work. Its research portfolio as
well as its internal organisation show the complexity of the issue area. For example, the
technological development of new road surfaces is embedded in environmental and safety
concerns. Similarly, the safety aspects of road transportation are handled within a division
that at the same time develops road management systems to make the infrastructure more
effective and efficient.
The international dimension characterising infrastructure and mobility is reflected by a
multitude of European (FEHRL, various EU Directorates General, CEN etc.) and other
international organisations. Van Rooten presented – as one example – FEHRL, which was13
established in 1989 in order to stimulate European cooperative research in the field of
highway engineering infrastructure and to provide advice to policymaking bodies at all
policy levels in Germany. The objectives of FEHRL mirror those of BRRC, i.e. FEHRL is
a European Forum and coordinating body for institutes both delivering strategic intelli-
gence to policy-makers and responsible for the development of new technologies. FEHRL
therefore is a good example that the form (European coordination) of strategic intelligence
follows the function (reconciliation of various conflicting interests and rationales, informa-
tion of various policy levels) it has to deliver. Most importantly, FEHRL, together with
industry and WERD (Western European Road Directors), has been part of an orchestration
process that led to the development of the Strategic European Road Research Programme
III (SERRP III). Through the close consultation of industry, research institutes and policy-
makers, a research road map for European transportation research – providing both input
for the policy discourse and concrete technological development – came into being. This
road map includes the use of the new European policy tools such as Integrated Projects and
Networks of Excellence that are perceived as an opportunity to intensify the integration
that has been going on for many years by means of self-organised networks and trans-
national organisations.
The discussion on the organisation and mission of highway research centred around the
ways in which stakeholders are integrated. Beyond the orchestration presented, in the case
of the Belgian Road Research Centre (BRRC) there are two further major means of inte-
gration, first, the contract research being done on behalf of or in cooperation with industry,
second, the internal organisation, as the technical committee also includes representatives
of industry. In line with the strategic efforts of closer coordination in the whole sector, it is
planned to increase the number of industrialists in the technical committee in the future.
In his presentation “Innovations in Transportation: Research and Policy Lessons of Recent
Successful Cases” Bert van Wee based the short discussion of a selection of innovation
cases with an analytical conceptual framework for the transport sector. Similarly to van
Rooten, van Wee stressed the (increasing) importance, complexity and peculiarities of the
transport area. To illustrate the complexity of policy, he presented a matrix of six policy-
measures3 impinging upon the five major determinants of transportation for environmental
impacts. As environmental impact is only one dimension of transport policy, this matrix
exemplified the magnitude of complexity in the area. Furthermore, van Wee discussed an-
other policy matrix which combined the four policy levels (European, national, regional,
local) and six policies that directly affect transportation (infrastructure, public transport,
pricing, spatial, speeds, environmental).
Van Wee introduced the case studies as examples of incremental changes and adjustments
in the transport sector. From his perspective, incremental change is the rule as radical in-
novations are hampered by the very characteristics of the sector, such as the number of
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actors with conflicting interests, persistent institutional barriers and dysfunctional organ-
isational structures (fragmentation, departmentalisation), cumbersome multi-level imple-
mentation, time needed for changes in land-use and planning and the magnitude of invest-
ment decisions.
For van Wee, one means to ease this situation and to deal with the complexity is to evalu-
ate policy options with the help of research and evaluation. As fragmented administrations
lack a holistic view on transportation issues, the Netherlands have introduced the OEEI
(Dutch abbreviation for Research on Economic Effects of Infrastructure) guidelines in or-
der to assess the impact of transportation measures ex ante and in a broad perspective, in-
cluding non-economic aspects. This approach also facilitates the use of systemic instru-
ments rather than individual, short-range measures.
Van Wee presented four case studies: the successful introduction of a park & ride system,
the temporarily limited access to a route through a small town in order to reduce the burden
to the inhabitants, reduction of emissions of motor vehicles by EU regulation and the de-
velopment of porous pavements on motorways to reduce noise emission. Although in most
cases the innovation itself was organisational rather than technological, these cases pro-
vided an overview of crucial success factors for innovation in the transportation area:
•  involvement of those actors affected by the consequences of action (industry as well as
users and those suffering from transportation side effects), and management of the inter-
facs between actors and institutions
•  convincing mobilisation of support by
-  demonstrating the magnitude of the problem
-  articulating the demand for innovation
-  proving the cost-effectiveness and equity of a proposed solution and
-  defining clear goals
•  use of ex ante research – preferably multi-disciplinary – to strengthen the case for action
and the potential benefit (although the role of research has not been equally important
for all cases)
•  individuals or administrative units (e.g. dedicated municipalities) who function as pol-
icy entrepreneurs
Van Wee strengthened his argument by discussing the results of comparative case study
research done by Cervero (1999). Besides adding new evidence, the discussion on Cervero
stressed, above all, the importance of vision and visionaries as well as the mobilisation of
entrepreneurial ethos for policy change.
The discussion following van Wee’s presentation mainly responded to his claim that within
systemic innovation policy those actors most affected should be involved and coordinated
as directly as possible. It was argued that this was an important normative claim, but only
to be fulfilled in local cases, while for national or European issues the coordination must15
take different forms and be much more indirect. Moreover, success of innovation policy
that is driven by the involvement of affected groups often shows positive results only for
these groups, but does not take the overall social costs into consideration. A second aspect
highlighted in the discussion was that van Wee showed impressively that many important,
albeit “incremental”, innovations are organisational rather than technological, and the
analysis of innovation as well as the coordination necessary for innovation should take
organisational change much more into focus.
The last contribution in the context of transportation was given by Marnix Bruggemann, a
journalist and researcher. Bruggemann discussed one specific case, the successful devel-
opment of a real-time public transport information service in the Netherlands, and he
thereby presented a model case for a step-wise, integrative approach enabling demand-
driven, technological innovation in the transportation sector. The system discussed guides
travellers by providing real-time information on connections and most effective use of the
various possible transport means. The origin of the system goes back to a small scale ini-
tiative by the Dutch government’s Department of Transport which proposed a user’s sur-
vey on the most pressing demand as regards transportation. To specify demand, the analy-
sis of this survey was discussed with individual users, resulting in the translation into tech-
nological demand. On that basis the technological possibilities were analysed, including
international benchmark studies on similar activities. One key recommendation from that
research was to build up a broad consortium that included users (behavioural knowledge),
technological experts (positioning, ICT), information service and network hardware pro-
viders, public transport operators and regional policy-makers. In order to raise awareness
and interest even further, a public tender for a feasibility study was issued, mobilising over
50 companies and spreading the word to all relevant industrial actors in the field in the
Netherlands. A small consortium with heterogeneous actors was picked which provided
not only the technological capabilities but also the necessary coordination and interface
management and a platform for standardisation of vehicle positioning.
Bruggemann identified four major reasons for success:
•  government initiated and supported the projects in times of stalemates, but did not fully
fund the whole development
•  government functioned as a network broker
•  early definition of a very clear and concrete aim
•  support of a new and open cluster (neue Kombination) in absence of existing industrial
consortia.
In 2002 the testing of the prototype system began, the consortium delivered.16
5. Systemic Policy Measures and Processes:
An International Comparison
The fourth session of the workshop was devoted to an international comparison of sys-
temic policy measures and processes. In his key note presentation, Erik Arnold, Technopo-
lis, introduced the major results of a study on the governance of research and innovation in
eight countries (Boekholt et al. 2002).4 The conceptual framework presented rests on the
Innovation Systems Approach in its established form (as developed among others by Nel-
son, Edquist or Lundvall) and the concept of “governance”. This combination led to a per-
spective on innovation policy5 that highlights bounded rationality of policy-makers and
stakeholders, path dependencies of policies, the importance of knowledge and learning for
the process of policy development and implementation, and, above all, the meaning of
networks and clusters (instead of individual actors).
In the context of innovation policy, Arnold defined the key dimensions as regards the
analysis of governance as:
•  identification of actors involved in decision-making
•  ways in which these actors determine direction, priorities and volume of science, tech-
nology and innovation
•  the structure of the government as co-determining the process of governance
•  identification of change agents in the system
Emerging governance schemes are a consequence of changing context conditions and at
the same time they need to respond to these changing conditions. For Arnold, the rationale
for intervention is rooted in the system failure approach, according to which policy needs
to respond to capability, institutional, network and framework failures rather than react
solely to market failures.
In this perspective, the major drivers for governance change are the increasing meaning of
mode 2 knowledge production, changes in the nature of technologies (dematerialising,
convergent) and industrial organisation of knowledge production (globalised, modularised,
de-integrated and accelerated). In addition, the relationship between science and society
(and government) sets the condition for innovation policy, as the state is buyer of knowl-
edge – which fosters departmentalisation of research as well – and patron of research –
                                                
4  The study was conducted by Technopolis and the University of Ottawa on behalf of the Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs. The countries are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden
and the United Kingdom. This summary not only draws on Erik Arnold’s presentation but also on the fi-
nal synthesis report of the study (Boekholt et al. 2002).
5  We stick to the usage of the term „innovation policy“ in its broad manner, including also governance for
research and technology, while Arnold used both the term “innovation policy” and “governance of re-
search and innovation”.17
which, in times of low budgets, has led to the overarching demand for “relevance” and
“solutions” of publicly financed research.
The impact of all these changes on the governance of innovation policy are complex and
still somewhat unclear. For Arnold, the key effects are as follows:
•  Emerging global knowledge markets with
•  globally optimised research and monitoring capacities of companies
•  requiring research institutes to become global players (super-universities)
•  the end of the linear (“three hump”) model of research
•  growing importance of intellectual property rights
•  new forms of public private partnerships (enlarged, institutionalised, international)
Against this conceptual and contextual background Arnold presented a focused and selec-
tive overview of the empirical results as regards current development in the governance of
innovation in eight countries. In face of the fragmented government structures, he intro-
duced a set of examples of how governments try to organise coordination and knowledge
integration.
It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss all examples in detail6. In most countries
some kind of high-level structure and process have been implemented in recent years in
order to cope with the challenges discussed. Although these challenges are obviously very
similar, the design examples discussed were very different from each other, both in terms
of their structure and in terms of their effectiveness. Most importantly, very diverse ap-
proaches have been taken  related to the institutional scope of integration and coordination,
some structures coordinating ministers, others concentrating on ministries and/ or agencies
and others trying to integrate stakeholder groups and those performing R&D.
The Finnish Science and Technology Policy Council, for example, was presented as a very
senior inter-ministerial institution that integrates five ministries and a set of key
stakeholders from the knowledge system under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. It
functions as a referee in cases of priority conflicts, as an arena of debate and exchange and
fosters horizontal coordination down to the working level. The major outcome are broad
principles and guidelines that are endorsed by the whole knowledge system, the Council is
rated to be highly effective and efficient. According to Arnold, there are indications that
many countries converge towards the Finnish model.
                                                
6  For a detailed analysis see Boekholt et al. (2003) (http://in3.dem.ist.utl.pt/master /03itt/lec_2_4.pdf ). For
additional information see also the more comprehensive report Arnold / Boekholt (2003) (http://www.
technopolis-group.com/reports/352_Meta_030127.pdf).18
Conversely, the interdepartmental Cabinet Committee on Science and Technology within
the Irish government only existed on paper, ignored by the whole Irish knowledge system.
A totally different approach was followed by the Norwegian government, which in the
1990s tried to simplify the whole knowledge system to ease coordination down to two
major pillars, one being mainly responsible for industry and mainly organised by the In-
dustry Ministry, one – The Research Council of Norway (RCN) – with a broader responsi-
bility and organised mainly by the Ministry of Education. However, this coordination ef-
fort was struggling, not only because of problems in the micro-management, but also be-
cause of insurmountable cultural differences within the knowledge system.
The Danish government recently introduced a super-ministry of Science, Technology and
Innovation and tried to pull all aspects  relating to science and innovation governance to-
gether. This is the most radical attempt at coordination, the success of which – however –
cannot be judged yet.
The study also found that the organisation and the conduct of strategic intelligence plays an
important and increasing role in almost all countries. Again, the Finnish example, where
the Science and Technology Policy Council takes up strategic intelligence and functions as
its broker, has developed into a role model.
In sum, the task of coordination, of bridging the gap between science and innovation, be-
tween different ministries, between policy and other stakeholders, is a driving force for all
governments, only few have proved successful. It is not the final structure for the coordi-
nation and integration, it is the dedication and commitment with which the actors in the
system follow the objective of coordination that makes the difference. Ideally, this com-
mitment is connected with extra money for coordination in the budget.
A final aspect presented by Arnold was the different ways of organising the allocation of
research money to research topics. In most countries the ministry is assisted by some kind
of intermediary research funder. This organisation is a good example of how the structure
determines the governance, as the funding institutions and their composition and compe-
tencies decide about participation in the allocation process and therefore about the ration-
ales and principles predominant in the research system.
Three ideal types were introduced: a mono-functional body only receives money from one
ministry for one issue area and distributes it to relevant research organisations; secondly, a
multi-client body that receives money from different ministries and allocates it to research
organisations from different research areas. Finally, umbrella organisations combine the
distribution of research money with a set of related economic or technological service
functions. Each model has its strengths and weaknesses. For example, within the umbrella
organisation, centre-division tensions tend to arise as divisions might be very specialised
and memberships very disintegrated. Governance problems in the multi-client mode arise
from competition between ministries as regards the service provided by the body. The
overall feature for all funding agencies, however, is that their effectiveness rests on the19
cooperation of the research institutes themselves, containing the dilemma that those who
cooperate with the funding agencies on the planning level are likely to improve their posi-
tion to get funds.
In his overall conclusion, Arnold stressed the fact that best practice relating to  the govern-
ance of “research and innovation” is extremely hard to derive due to context embedded-
ness. In any case, the personal commitment of the head of government and the relevant
ministries has proven a central key to success. Moreover, it pays off to provide structures
that are able to deal with horizontal concerns. Governance schemes are the more robust
and effective, the more they integrate strategic intelligence. It seems that multi-client and
umbrella structures are becoming increasingly popular, which, despite functional advan-
tages, runs the risk of lock-ins through the increasing role of those actors that receive re-
search money. In closing with a good, proactive example, Arnold pointed towards the new
Norwegian Research Council which on a very high level integrates research and innovation
policies and puts – structurally – emphasis on taking advantage of strategic intelligence.
However, after all the context dependency of governance in research and innovation ren-
ders the transferability of structures and approaches difficult.
This last conclusion was taken up by the audience in the discussion following Arnold’s
presentation. There was consensus on the context dependence of governance and govern-
ment as regards research and innovation. But because of this, more elaboration on the cate-
gorisation of the context and the meaning of context variables for governance was asked
for. In addition to the comparison of different countries, the analysis should try to extract
more general conclusions on the meaning of context variables for innovation governance,
thus conceptualising analysis and policymaking beyond single cases. Arnold agreed, and
added that comparison is eased if one concentrated on the functions that are to be fulfilled
rather than the underlying structures. Another point raised was the importance of the size
of a country. It was argued that Arnold’s analysis showed how smaller countries are better
capable of governance change and systemic approaches, and that bigger countries and even
the EU could very well learn from these approaches. Furthermore, the earlier discussion on
a common strategy vision was taken up again. One participant argued that the common
strategy vision was much more important as a prerequisite for functional and effective
governance than the organisation of the governance process. From his empirical experi-
ence, Arnold wholeheartedly agreed.20
6. Conclusions: A Round-table Discussion and the “Karlsruhe –
Utrecht Principles for Horizontal and
Systemic Innovation Policymaking”
6.1 Round Table on New Governance in Innovation Systems
The final discussion on „new governance on innovation“ was organised as a round- able of
invited participants, chaired by Stefan Kuhlmann (ISI and University of Utrecht), sharing
their thoughts on innovation policy, followed by an open debate by all participants. This
discussion not only reflected the debate of the workshop, but also the so-called "Karlsruhe-
Utrecht Principles for Horizontal and Systemic Innovation Policymaking". This discussion
paper had been distributed to the participants of the workshop beforehand in order to initi-
ate debate and to prepare the resolution of such principles as a result of the discussion.
Therefore, some speakers of the round-table referred not only to the previous discussion in
the workshop, but also to these principles. After a summary of the roundtable discussion
and some concluding comments by Frieder Meyer-Krahmer, head of the host organisation
Fraunhofer ISI, this report will conclude with these principles as they have been re-
formulated after the conclusion of the workshop, taking into consideration the lively dis-
cussion they provoked.
As first speaker of the round-table, Theo Roeland, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Nether-
lands, described the innovation approach of his country as following the systemic model.
The major challenge in the last years had been to bring together science policy, innovation
policy and industrial policy, despite all existing departmentalisation. This integration was
not tried with the help of a super-ministry model as the Danish government is trying it, but
by coordinating the top-level of the various ministries and by enabling self-organisation of
the system. Although the Netherlands have created a new organisation, for Roeland the
major key is not re-organisation, but the commitment to a visible strategy and a clear pri-
ority-setting. Therefore, the definition of a clear strategy as major prerequisite for hori-
zontal policymaking was his major criticism as regards the first draft of the Karlsruhe-
Utrecht principles. Commenting on current developments at the European level, Roeland
argued that the clustering of excellence throughout Europe was a good approach, however,
the centres of excellence foreseen should be much broader and ambitious enough to chal-
lenge the leading global players like Stanford or MIT. Finally, Roeland pointed towards
the importance of the very practical level, such as an effective European patent system, for
the fulfilment of the European vision, to create ERA and to become a leading European
knowledge economy,
Engelbert Beyer, German Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF), Ger-
many, in principle agreed with the theoretical analysis underlying the workshop7. How-
ever, he still could not see a satisfactory explanation as to why coordination often does not
                                                
7  See chapter one and the following at the end.21
work although he is convinced that many policy-makers meanwhile know and follow the
innovation systems approach and try to think in holistic and systematic terms. In his view,
analysis should focus more on bureaucracy and different societal interests. At the same
time, the need for coordination should not be overstressed, especially not as regards formal
organisation. Rather, Beyer called for coordination by consensus-building. Furthermore, he
argued that the different actors in the system, e.g. agencies and institutes, should be given
more freedom for self-organisation, including, for example, freedom of budget and strategy
for research institutes. Beyer ended by pointing towards what he regarded as most impor-
tant future areas of systemic policy: biotechnology, where the BMBF has achieved consid-
erable success through clustering efforts; support for SMEs, which needs broad coordina-
tion given the multitude of funding possibilities; and finally venture capital, which for
Beyer is an example of a successful coordination by a broad consensus of the viability of
new financing instruments.
Rainer Jäkel, German Federal Ministry for Economics and Labour (BMWA), Germany,
claimed that horizontal innovation policy was an approach that is deeply embedded in the
culture of his ministry which followed a German policy model called “Ordnungspolitik”,
in essence a policy that stresses the importance of a regulatory framework in which the
market economy can unfold and is checked. The problem for him was not the idea of the
horizontal approach, but the existence of very strong vertical interests that cut across hori-
zontal coordination. However, as the efforts as regards horizontal policy will continue,
Jäkel strongly agreed with many of the previous speakers on the importance of visions and
strategy. As regards organisational improvements, Jäekel called for much more flexible
structures and processes within and between administrations. For example, rotation be-
tween ministries, and between ministries and industry should be facilitated, and pro-
gramme managers should compete more among themselves. Finally, policy evaluation
should not only focus on the content, output and outcome of policies, but also comprise the
policy structures.
Finally, Robin Miège, who is now at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commis-
sion and who from 1984 to 1998 was responsible for innovation policymaking in various
positions within the European Commission, shared his experience with innovation policy-
making in the European Commission. He described the challenge of internal coordination
in the course of issuing Commission action plans on innovation. For example, to issue the
1
st Action Plan on Innovation in 1996, 150 EU administrators had to be coordinated. An-
other example was the organisation of a communication process in order to involve regions
into the drafting of regional innovation policy schemes as early as 1994.
From his experience, Miège derived the major problems in innovation policymaking as
being communicative, as innovation is not an easy message ready for headlines, and intra-
organisational, as innovation means change within organisations that for many reasons
resist it. Miège referred to the European Research Area (ERA) initiative as a positive ex-
ample of coordination: there was a clear message rooted in a common intellectual frame-
work and connected to a vision and a clear political will issued from the top level within22
the Commission. The commitment that was communicated stirred up the whole commu-
nity. Although there was – according to Miège – still resistance to ERA from national pol-
icy-makers for whom coordination – in the short term – would mean loss of autonomy, the
whole process can be labelled as a success. In addition to the communication strategy,
Miège traced the “success” of ERA also back to adjusted internal structures and processes
within the Commission. As a consequence of massive criticism at the end of the 1990s, the
Commission has become more accountable, more transparent and more flexible: fluctua-
tion between Commission services is more common, Directorates General have been as-
sessed and the communication of European policy initiatives are preceded by policy impact
assessments, including impact cross-cutting different policy areas. In light of these inter-
pretations of the ERA process, and despite existing pitfalls and problems, Miège demon-
strated optimism as regards future coordination of innovation policy at the European level.
The round-table statements were followed up by intensive general debate. One major as-
pect taken up was the feasibility and consequences of self-organisation. While almost all
speakers in the workshop had embraced this notion, some scepticism was raised as to the
potential "coordination trap of self-organisation" (Kuhlmann) stemming from lock-ins of
established interest and power structures. Similarly, it was emphasised that network struc-
tures of coordination can also be captured by strong lobbies, and analysts and policy-
makers were asked to find solutions for that. In addition, various people pointed towards
further prerequisites for self-coordination: self-coordinated networks need information
about development in their environment, they need rules to function and they need strong
mandates from the top of the structure (facilitated by a crisis or a relevant societal need).
Referring to the example of sustainability, the possible dysfunctionality of self-
coordination was demonstrated, as for reasons just mentioned, self-coordinated networks
are rather short-term oriented, their perspective does not exceed the time-frame of the indi-
vidual interest represented in the network. Or as one policy-maker put it: long term visions
to coordinate a system are not “good to sell”.
A second major aspect raised in the concluding discussion was the issue of a common vi-
sion for coordination. The perspective taken was a European one, and it was questioned if
the demand for a common vision in face of the diverse governance and innovation cultures
and traditions in Europe, increasing with enlargement, would be functional – and feasible.
There seemed to be a dilemma here: with enlargement, the call for self-coordination could
become louder as the complexity increases and hierarchical coordination would collapse.
At the same time, a common vision and strategy to ease self-coordination is becoming
more difficult to define. The European model called for, therefore, would be a right mix of
long-term vision and framework, a set of clear rules and procedures ensuring a minimum
of coordination and enough freedom for diverse models to compete.
In his closing remarks, Frieder Meyer-Krahmer resumed central aspects of the discussion
and linked them to the “Karlsruhe – Utrecht Principles ”. For him, there was a clear con-
sensus visible as regards the reasons to have such principles, the driving factors for a hori-
zontal policy coordination. It was less clear, however, what the criteria are for the selection23
of the various solutions proposed in the workshop as well as in the Principles. Here he
asked for further elaboration by policy and innovation analysts. In a third dimension,
Meyer-Krahmer discussed possible success factors for policy coordination to take place.
These included:
•  principles of guidance (vision, leadership, orchestration of conflicting interests, self
organisation)
•  cultural fit of coordination schemes and trust
•  design of appropriate organisation of coordination, avoiding best practice-trap and re-
sponding to specific contexts
•  process-management and personal mobility
•  reflexivity and appropriate distribution and organisation of intelligence
•  taking into consideration the dynamics of government (development over time, radical
changes outside the system)
Adressing the research community, Meyer-Krahmer finally called for further international
comparison of functions (rather than structures) as regards governance of innovation and
research, the condition and meaning of culture and trust for governance and finally more
analysis as regards incentive structures and implications for coordination.
6.2 Karlsruhe Principles Karlsruhe-Utrecht Principles for Horizon-
tal and Systemic Innovation Policymaking
Introductory remark: The principles presented on the following pages are a revised version
of the first draft that was distributed before the workshop and discussed by the participants.
The various comments and suggestions expressed were fed into this final draft. However,
these Principles are not to be understood as a consensual result of the workshop, as there
was no resolution. Rather, they represent the thoughts of the four authors named in the
endnote.24
„KARLSRUHE-UTRECHT PRINCIPLES FOR
HORIZONTAL AND SYSTEMIC INNOVATION
POLICYMAKING“*
Discussed at the workshop
„New Governance for Innovation? The Need for Horizontal Policy Co-ordination“,
held at the occasion of the 30
th anniversary of the Fraunhofer Institute Systems and Innovation Research
(ISI), Karlsruhe/Germany, 14/15 November 2002,
organised in collaboration with the Dept. of Innovation Studies, Utrecht University,
and the „Six Countries Programme – the Innovation Policy Network” (http://www.6cp.net/)
Science, technology and innovations based thereon play a significant role today in the economies
of the industrialised countries and are a driving force in their international competition. National
and increasingly also regional governments and transnational agencies pursue, more or less explic-
itly, „innovation policies“, defined here as the entirety of all public initiatives regarding science,
education, research, technological development and industrial modernisation, overlapping also with
industrial, environmental, labour and social policies. Public innovation policy aims to strengthen
the competitiveness of an economy or of selected sectors, in order to increase societal welfare
through knowledge creation and economic success.
Schumpeter (1934) introduced the concept of innovation as „creative destruction” (of existing
structures) and the establishment of „new combinations” leading to new structures. Innovation
research revealed the genuinely social character of innovation processes: innovative artefacts and
structures are socially constructed, i.e. „man-made”, thus – almost by definition – shaped by
bounded rationality evolving along historical trajectories (incremental innovation). At the same
time innovation may emerge in a non deterministic manner, led by trial and error, inter-linking
heterogeneous worlds, thus providing unknown opportunities (radical innovation). Innovation the-
ory tries to cover the tension between the bounded and the non-deterministic character of innova-
tion by introducing a system perspective on related actors, institutions and processes. The hetero-
geneity of (sub-)systems may hamper communication and thus block innovation, but may also feed
it – if effective communication comes about and stimulates learning. How could innovation policy
turn heterogeneity productively?
                                                
* The principles were compiled by Stefan Kuhlmann (ISI/Utrecht), Ruud Smits (Utrecht); Frieder Meyer-Krahmer
(ISI), Jakob Edler (ISI). Contact: s.kuhlmann@isi.fraunhofer.de;   http://www.isi.fhg.de/
The authors are grateful for valuable suggestions made by workshop participants, in particular by Attila Havas (Hungar-
ian Academy of Sciences), Jan Larosse (IWT; Brussels), and Harro van Lente (Utrecht University).
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The following Karlsruhe-Utrecht Principles for Horizontal and Systemic Innovation Policymaking
are a set of valuing and normative statements intended to stimulate debate and foster the develop-
ment of fresh policy approaches.
Presently the governance of politico-administrative systems in general and public innovation policy
in particular in most OECD countries is characterised by
  a high degree of departmentalisation, sectoralisation of the political administration, and low
inter-departmental exchange and co-operation
  heterogeneous, un-linked actor and stakeholder arenas, which in turn often are caught by cor-
poratist negotiation deadlocks
  failing attempts at restructuring responsibilities in government because of institutional inertia
  a dominance of a „linear model“ of research and innovation in policy approaches, failing to
enable new combinations of knowledge, demand and public interventions (the rise of „mode 2”
knowledge production)
  a design of „innovation policy“ as a very specific, narrowly defined  field focusing on intro-
duction of new technologies in small and medium sized enterprises, on intellectual property
rights or on venture capital provision etc.
  a clash of medium- and long-term innovation issues and short-term policy cycles
  an emerging multi-level governance in the context of the European integration making the
launching of horizontal and systemic policy approaches even more difficult.
New modes of governance – and relatedly: government – would require (1) a broader understanding
of public policies for innovation, (2) a set of overarching goals, and (3) success factors facilitating
the achievement of such goals.
(1) A broader understanding of public policies for innovation would be build on the following
ideas:
  Horizontal and systemic concepts of innovation policymaking needs to start from the heuristic
concept of innovation systems. Innovation systems encompass the „biotopes” of all those in-
stitutions which are engaged in scientific research, the accumulation and diffusion of knowl-
edge, which educate and train the working population, develop technology, produce innovative
products and processes, and distribute them. Policymaking occurs in multi-actor arenas char-
acterised by inevitably differing and even contradictory problem perceptions, interests and val-
ues of actor groups.
  Organisation and content of governance has to take into account the systemic and co-
evolutionary nature of innovation, including the notion of complex, non-linear interaction (e.g.
stimulating multi-disciplinary research, fostering the debate on implications of „mode 2” for
universities and other institutions in the innovation system, in particular with more regard to
missions, culture, reward structures, relations between institutions, quality control, ...).
  A broader understanding of public policies for innovation presupposes institutional reflexivity,
understood as the capacity to think in terms of the whole, to think in terms of problems and
solutions, to anticipate future needs.26
(2) Horizontal and systemic innovation policies would aim at the following overarching goals:
  There is a need for a holistic notion of innovation policy, keeping in mind and taking advantage
of the inter-dependence of specific policy measures as well as the inter-relation of different
policy areas (fostering cluster approaches, infrastructures facilitating the identification of and
access to strategic intelligence, co-ordinating bodies with a real mandate, a parliamentary
committee on innovation, …).
  In the light of the fusion of heterogeneous technologies, of the increasing integration of basic
research, applied research and innovation, of high- and low-tech sectors, of old and new
economies, of manufacturing and services, government and administration have to deal more
proactively with the challenge of moderating cross-sectoral linkages and supporting the
(re-)structuring of cross-sectoral networks (e.g. horizontal taskforces, sectoral councils, ...).
  Systemic concepts of innovation policy will foster a co-evolution of techno-economic and so-
cio-institutional transition processes. Necessary transformations of traditional socio-technic in-
frastructures would be prepared in the light of systemic analyses, and would be developed with
a careful orchestration of decisionmaking processes in multi-actor arenas.
  Systemic policy instruments have to be oriented towards mid- and long-term future demand:
they would strive for a sustainable development, a better balance of push and pull, and would
foster the involvement of users and future generations, e.g. by stimulating public discourse on
innovation needs.
  In Europe, innovation policy requires more elaborated forms of institutionalised co-ordination
between the European level on the one hand and the national and regional level on the other
(e.g. initiating a political debate on a new multi-level governance and ‘division of labour’ be-
tween the various administrative levels, resulting in transparent decisions and strategies, fur-
thering the development of networks of excellence, ...).
(3) Success factors facilitating the achievement of such goals of horizontal and systemic innova-
tion policies would include:
  A continuous reflection and implementation of appropriate principles of guidance and govern-
ance, e.g. with respect to strong leadership on the one hand and participatory approaches on
the other.
  Identification of situations of system crisis, providing historical opportunities for – often exter-
nally induced – radical changes of institutions and policies, whereas incremental adaptation to
changing needs may well be achieved from inside institutions.
  In case of market-borne techno-economic transition processes: a start from lead markets.
  Creation and maintenance of a culture of reliability and trust, also between competing actor
groups.
  Building an infrastructure for strategic intelligence by establishing, maintaining, and inter-
linking sources (e.g. Technology Assessment, Foresight, Evaluation, Benchmarking), improv-
ing accessibility for all relevant actors (clearing house) and stimulating the development of the
capacity to produce strategic information tailored to the needs of actors involved.
  Platforms for learning and experimenting: learning by doing, by using, by interacting, and
learning at system level (= add value to the whole system).27
  Re-organisation of administrations in a way that enables flexible horizontal co-ordination and
exchange among formally divided entities (task-oriented mobility of staff, integrated teams,
changes in reward systems that stimulate horizontal initiatives, new career tracks facilitating
easy moving between industry, science, public administration ...).
  A new breed of innovation policy-makers necessitating related education and training pro-
grammes in higher education, combining e.g. administrative and legal aspects with economic,
technological and social perspectives.28
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